ms1.hinet.net email servers, SPF and DMARC

ms1.hinet.net publishes 3 MX hosts; senders try the lowest priority number first (ms-smtp-cmx1.hinet.net, 0) and fall back to the others in order.

1 other domain we checked on the same day also route mail to hosts under hinet.net, with different records from ms1.hinet.net: hinet.net.

The record on 5 November 2026 was v=spf1 redirect=spf.ms.hinet.net.

In plain terms, it delegates to spf.ms.hinet.net. The top level uses 1 DNS-querying term; SPF allows 10 in total including nested includes (RFC 7208 §4.6.4).

The record is v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:[email protected].

p=quarantine asks receivers to send failing mail to spam.

Aggregate reports go to ms1.hinet.net, so the domain's owner sees who sends mail as @ms1.hinet.net.

What that means for you: if a contact gives an @ms1.hinet.net address and you send to them, nothing changes. But never put an @ms1.hinet.net address in the From line of mail sent through your own tool or ESP. It can't pass DMARC for ms1.hinet.net, and this policy tells receivers to junk it.

Our checker treats @ms1.hinet.net like any domain: syntax, MX, disposable and role checks first, then a made-up address to rule out a catch-all, then your address at RCPT TO, disconnecting without sending. We have not published a test of how ms-smtp-cmx1.hinet.net answers for @ms1.hinet.net, so we make no claim here about whether single mailboxes can be confirmed; each result carries its own reason.

DNS tells you where mail goes, not whether one person's mailbox still exists. For a list, run the whole file through a verifier before you send: invalid rows come out, risky rows (catch-all, unknown, refused) go in their own segment, and valid rows are safe to mail.