walla.co.il email servers, SPF and DMARC

walla.co.il publishes 2 MX hosts, all at priority 5, so senders spread mail across them.

The record on 5 November 2026 was v=spf1 a mx include:spfa.walla.co.il include:spfb.walla.co.il include:spfc.walla.co.il include:spfd.walla.co.il include:mymarketing.co.il include:activetrail.com ~all.

In plain terms, it delegates to spfa.walla.co.il, spfb.walla.co.il, spfc.walla.co.il, spfd.walla.co.il, mymarketing.co.il and activetrail.com. The top level uses 8 DNS-querying terms; SPF allows 10 in total including nested includes (RFC 7208 §4.6.4).

It ends in a soft fail (~all): mail from unlisted servers should be accepted but treated as suspicious.

The record is v=DMARC1;p=reject;.

p=reject asks receivers to refuse mail that fails DMARC.

What that means for you: if a contact gives an @walla.co.il address and you send to them, nothing changes. But never put an @walla.co.il address in the From line of mail sent through your own tool or ESP. It can't pass DMARC for walla.co.il, and this policy tells receivers to refuse it.

Our checker treats @walla.co.il like any domain: syntax, MX, disposable and role checks first, then a made-up address to rule out a catch-all, then your address at RCPT TO, disconnecting without sending. We have not published a test of how mx1.hc494-80.c3s2.iphmx.com answers for @walla.co.il, so we make no claim here about whether single mailboxes can be confirmed; each result carries its own reason.

DNS tells you where mail goes, not whether one person's mailbox still exists. For a list, run the whole file through a verifier before you send: invalid rows come out, risky rows (catch-all, unknown, refused) go in their own segment, and valid rows are safe to mail.